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I. INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly complex and stressful society, characterized by
the erosion of family and community, it is not surprising that mental
illness is so prevalent. A recent study estimated that fifty-two million
Americans suffer from mental illness each year.1 This represents more
than twenty-eight percent of the adult population, more than one in
four.2 These statistics are conservative because the researchers counted
only people meeting the diagnostic criteria for a mental disorder. Those
suffering only from "problems in living," such as marital problems, were
excluded.3  Moreover, while thirty-five million Americans suffer from
continuing symptoms, almost nine million (more than five percent of the
adult population) develop a problem for the first time each year, and
another eight million suffer a relapse of symptoms experienced in a prior
* Copyright 1996 by Bruce J. Winick, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of
Law. This Article in somewhat different form will appear as a chapter in the author's forthcoming
book, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW. I would like to
acknowledge Paul Sherman for sharing his valuable insights on advance directive instruments, and
the helpful comments of Mary Coombs, Clark Freshman, Pat Gudridge, Rob Rosen, and Susan
Stefan on an earlier draft of this Article presented at a University of Miami School of Law faculty
seminar. I would also like to acknowledge the research assistance of Douglas Stransky and Bill
Collins.
1. See Darrel A. Regier et al., The de Facto U.S. Mental and Addictive Disorders Service
System, 50 ARcHvS GEN. PSYCHIATRY 85, 88 (1993); see also Daniel Goleman, Mental
Disorders Common, but Few Get Treatment, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 1993, at C13
(discussing study by Regier et al.).
2. See Goleman, supra note 1, at C13.
3. See Goleman, supra note 1, at C13 (reporting on interview with Dr. Regier, principle
author of Regier et al., supra note 1).
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year.4 The study also showed that only 28.5% of those suffering from
some form of mental illness obtained treatment for their problems.5
The prevalence of mental illness suggests the need to reexamine
our attitudes about it. We can no longer regard mental illness as affect-
ing only a small minority of people whom we can ignore. The likeli-
hood is high that mental illness will strike a member of our own family,
if not ourselves. Understanding this risk should make us all wonder
about what we will do if mental illness should befall us or a close family
member. Other illnesses, of course, occur frequently. We increasingly
worry about cancer, heart disease, and AIDS, and prudent people seek to
change their eating, smoking, drinking, and sexual habits to minimize
the risk. We also think about what we would do if we or a family mem-
ber was affected by one of these conditions. Planning for future mental
illness is trickier in some ways. Treatment decisions relating to cancer,
heart disease, and AIDS are largely left to the individual; the state does
not insist on one treatment approach rather than another, or require treat-
ment when it is unwanted.
With mental illness, treatment decisions are frequently made differ-
ently. First, the state may insist on psychiatric hospitalization and vari-
ous forms of mental health treatment on an involuntary basis. Second,
when mental illness strikes, individuals may not be able to make their
own treatment decisions. Other illnesses, such as cancer, heart disease,
and AIDS, usually do not impair cognitive processes, at least not until a
fairly final stage. Mental illness, however, sometimes prevents people
from engaging in rational decisionmaking about treatment and hospitali-
zation. In such cases, an individual may find that his or her decision-
making power has been taken away and placed in the hands of a
guardian or other surrogate decisionmaker, such as a judge or adminis-
trative body.
The prospect of losing control over the ability to make crucial hos-
pitalization and treatment decisions should we become mentally ill is a
frightening one. This prospect, coupled with the high prevalence rate
for mental illness, provides a new incentive to think ahead about mental
health treatment possibilities, to understand how the law may respond to
mental illness, and, if possible, to avoid unpleasant treatment options
and secure more desirable alternatives.
The law remains in flux concerning the extent to which those suf-
fering from mental illness may be subjected to involuntary hospitaliza-
tion and treatment. A movement to abolish or seriously curtail
involuntary hospitalization, begun in the 1960's, succeeded in restricting
4. See Goleman, supra note 1, at C13.
5. See Regier et al., supra note 1, at 90.
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civil commitment,6 but more recently the pendulum has swung back in
the direction of expanding the legal criteria for involuntary hospitaliza-
tion.7 The question of the extent to which mental patients have a right to
refuse treatment was first raised in the 1970's.1 Although it has drawn
much judicial, legislative, and scholarly attention, the issue remains
largely unresolved. 9
In view of these legal uncertainties, how can a prudent person fac-
ing the increased possibility of an encounter with mental illness plan for
the future? The Supreme Court's landmark "right-to-die" case, Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,0 presents an opportunity to
view these unresolved legal issues in a new light and to plan for future
mental illness. In Cruzan, the Court determined that it was constitution-
ally permissible for a state to require clear and convincing evidence of a
patient's desires before terminating life-sustaining medical treatment."
While upholding this condition on exercise of the "right to die," the
Court's opinion suggests that when the patient's intention to discontinue
such treatment is clearly expressed in a living will or other advance
directive instrument, the patient's right to refuse life-prolonging treat-
ment or nourishment will be constitutionally protected.12
By recognizing the ability of patients to make treatment decisions
in advance, Cruzan introduces a new dimension - time - that allows
us to view the right to refuse psychiatric hospitalization and treatment
6. See ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 609-
18 (1974). Compare, e.g., THOMAS S. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (5th ed. 1968)
(critiquing the concept of mental illness as justification for involuntary hospitalization and
treatment) with Paul Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 496 (1976) (arguing for a return to the use of medical criteria to involuntarily
commit people).
7. See, e.g., Mary L. Durham & John Q. La Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy
Implications of Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitments, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 395, 398 (1984); John Monahan et al., Coercion and Commitment: Understanding
Involuntary Mental Hospital Admission, 18 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249, 249 (1995).
8. Bruce J. Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 769, 811 & nn. 230-31 (citing early fight to refuse cases and commentary from the
early 1970's).
9. See BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIoT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT (forthcoming
1996). Compare Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 136-37 (1992) with Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
10. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
11. See id. at 283. The Missouri Supreme Court had rejected the request of parents of a
comatose accident victim to withdraw artificial feeding and hydration because "there was no clear
and convincing evidence of [the patient's] desire to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn
under such circumstances." Id. at 265. The United States Supreme Court determined that the
Missouri Supreme Court's clear and convincing evidence requirement furthered the state's interest
in preservation of human life, as well as several additional state interests, and that the requirement
did not violate the patient's due process rights. See id. at 281.
12. See id. at 278; see also infra note 14 and accompanying text.
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differently. Cruzan allows us to reframe these issues and creates new
possibilities for resolving involuntary hospitalization and right-to-refuse
treatment problems. Indeed, in many cases, it allows us to avoid these
problems altogether.
Cruzan allows us to view involuntary commitment and treatment
refusal issues as opportunities for advance planning, rather than as dis-
putes in need of judicial or administrative resolution. In many cases, the
advance planning that these developments permit may enable the indi-
vidual to exercise control over hospitalization and treatment issues, ren-
dering dispute resolution in these areas unnecessary. Moreover, the
possibilities that Cruzan creates for advance planning in the area of
mental health treatment and hospitalization present new therapeutic
opportunities as well.
This Article analyzes how living wills and other advance directive
instruments may be used in the mental health context. Part II examines
Cruzan and the extent to which the Court's endorsement of the living
will can and should apply to the use of advance directive instruments,
designed to control future hospitalization and treatment, by those with
mental illness or who fear they may someday encounter it.13 Part III
analyzes limits on the legal enforceability of advance directives in this
context. It suggests that the state will and should enjoy somewhat wider
latitude in regulating advance directives that elect a particular treatment
than those that refuse treatment. Although state law will be able to limit
the effectiveness of both types of instruments, individuals interested in
selecting future treatment in advance will retain a significant ability to
do so. This part also analyzes the state's ability to limit the enforceabil-
ity of advance directives by asserting a police power interest in doing so,
compared to a parens patriae interest in promoting the individual's wel-
fare. It suggests that the state's police power interest in protecting the
safety of others will trump the individual's interest in advance decision-
making, but that the state's parens patriae interest rarely will do so.
Part III then analyzes the distinction between advance instruction direc-
tives, through which the individual specifies particular treatment
choices, and health-care proxies and durable powers of attorney, by
which the individual designates a relative or friend to make decisions on
his or her behalf during any future period of incompetence. It suggests
that the state will give a greater degree of effectiveness to the former and
13. As used herein, "advance directive instruments" is a general term that includes both
health-care instruction directives, and health-care proxies and powers of attorney. This is
consistent with common usage. See, e.g., Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § 1(1), 9 U.L.A. 222
(Supp. 1996) ('Advance health-care directive' means an individual instruction or a power of
attorney for health care."). For the distinction between advance directives and health-care
instruction directives and health-care proxies or durable powers of attorney, see infra Part III.C.
[Vol. 51:57
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may impose limits on the ability of a proxy decisionmaker to act on
behalf of the incompetent individual.
Part IV analyzes the therapeutic value of advance directive instru-
ments in the mental health context. Planning for future problems may
help to avoid them. Moreover, when treatment proves necessary, having
planned for it in advance can increase its therapeutic efficacy. Part V
discusses the revocation and amendment of advance directive instru-
ments. It proposes a method by which "irrevocable" advance directive
instruments can be judicially or administratively changed when unfore-
seeable circumstances arise.
The Article concludes that advance directive instruments can be a
useful means of planning for mental illness and of avoiding disputes
concerning hospitalization and treatment. The avoidance of hearings,
either judicial or administrative, to resolve these controversies would
produce considerable fiscal and administrative savings. It also could
prevent diversion of scarce clinical resources from treatment to dispute
resolution. In addition, it would avoid the patient dissatisfaction that
results when patients lose such hearings and that sometimes produces a
psychological reactance that undermines the chances for successful
treatment. Even apart from these considerations, however, the law
should facilitate the use of advance directive instruments because they
both promote individual autonomy and present significant therapeutic
potential.
II. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE INSTRUMENTS AND THOSE WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS
Cruzan and its state court counterparts1 4 have recognized that a
patient enjoys a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in making his
or her own future health-care decisions. 5 Although these cases
14. See, e.g., New Mark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Del. 1991); In re Dubreuil, 629
So. 2d 819, 828 (Fla. 1993); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990); In re
Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Mass.), cert. denied sub non. Doe v. Gross, 503
U.S. 950 (1992); Gleason v. Abrams, 593 A.2d 1232, 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991);
Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 623 N.E.2d 513, 514 (N.Y. 1993); McKay v.
Bergsted, 801 P.2d 617, 622 (Nev. 1990); In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Wis.
1992); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW § 15-11 (2d ed. 1988).
A number of courts have recognized the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment based on
common law. See In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3, 6 (Ga. 1992); In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d
1194, 1201 (Ill. 1990); Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 755-56 (Md. 1993); In re Rosebush, 491
N.W.2d 633, 635-36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
15. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. The Court noted that "[tjhe principle that a competent person
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be
inferred from our prior decisions," and was willing to assume, "for purposes of this case.... that
the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to
refuse life sustaining hydration and nutrition." Id. at 278-79; see also id. at 289 (O'Connor, J.,
1996]
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involved the right of a terminally ill patient to discontinue life-prolong-
ing treatment or nourishment, their language and rationale suggest that
the right includes a broad liberty interest in accepting or refusing treat-
ment that extends to the mental health context. 16 Moreover, these cases
indicate that individuals have a constitutional right to make health-care
decisions not only when they are competent, but also when they are
incompetent, as long as they indicated in advance the manner in which
they wished their right to be exercised or other evidence exists concern-
ing what their wishes would have been.1 7 Surrogates traditionally exer-
cised an incompetent person's right to make health-care decisions.
Recent legal developments suggest that such surrogate decisionmaking
should reflect the patient's values, rather than some objective view of
the best interests of the patient."' Under Cruzan, patients are given an
opportunity to express their desires about future treatment.' 9 Depending
concurring). The Cruzan Court cited three earlier decisions involving psychiatric patients to
support the right to refuse treatment: Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480 (1980), and Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). See id. at 278. In Harper, the
Court recognized that mentally ill, convicted prisoners possess "a significant liberty interest in
avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 494 U.S. at 221-22, quoted in Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. The Cruzan
Court cited Vitek for the proposition that a prisoner's "transfer to a mental hospital coupled with
mandatory behavior modification implicated liberty interests." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. Finally,
quoting Parham, the Court noted that "a child, in common with adults, has a substantial liberty
interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment." Id. at 278-79 (quoting
Parham, 442 U.S. at 600).
16. See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986); In re Rosa M., 597 N.Y.S.2d 544,
545 (Sup. Ct. 1991); JUDITH C. AHRONHEIM ET AL., ETHICS IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 16-19 (1994);
Lester J. Perling, Comment, Health Care Advance Directives: Implications for Florida Mental
Health Patients, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 193, 206 (1993). This conclusion is also supported by the
Cruzan Court's reliance on cases from the mental health context in reaching its conclusion that the
Constitution protects a liberty interest in refusing treatment. See cases cited supra note 14.
17. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271 (stating that "an incompetent person retains the same rights
as a competent individual 'because the value of human dignity extends to both,"' and adopting a
substituted judgment standard under which courts must determine what the incompetent person's
decision would have been under the circumstances) (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 427, 431, 434 (Mass. 1977)); In re Westchester County Med.
Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 612 (N.Y. 1988); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1982); In re Rosa
M., 597 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
18. See AHRONHEIM ET AL., supra note 15, at 17-18; ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK,
DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETICS OF SURROGATE DECIsIONMAKING 350-57 (1989) (reviewing
the moral and ethical arguments supporting the use of advance directives and surrogate
decisionmaking); see also Alison Patrucco Barnes, Florida Guardianship and the Elderly: The
Paradoxical Right to Unwanted Assistance, 40 U. FLA. L. REv. 949, 988 (1988); Ezekiel J.
Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Proxy Decision Making for Incompetent Patients, 267 JAMA
2067, 2071 (1992); Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. Appelbaum, The Substituted Judgment
Approach: Its Difficulties and Paradoxes in Mental Health Settings, 13 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE
61, 64 (1985); Robert M. Wettstein & Loren H. Roth, The Psychiatrist as Legal Guardian, 145
Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 600, 604 (1988).
19. In Cruzan, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Missouri's requirement that, for an
advance directive instrument to be effective, there must be clear and convincing evidence of the
[Vol. 51:57
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on the clarity of their expression, these preferences will bind treatment
providers or, in the case of health-care proxies, bind the surrogate or
provide strong guidance for the exercise of surrogate decisionmaking.
As a result of these developments, patients are empowered to make
advance decisions concerning health-care needs that may arise when
they are incapacitated. They may do so either orally or in writing, pur-
suant to health-care proxies, living wills, or other advance directive
instruments. As long as there is clear and convincing evidence concern-
ing the patient's desires, Cruzan implies that the patient may choose in
advance to discontinue life-prolonging treatment or nourishment that
may be provided in the future.2 °
Cruzan also implies that the state's interest in prolonging life, how-
ever important it may be, will not outweigh a patient's clearly expressed
desire to discontinue life-support treatment or nourishment. Although
the Court recognized a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refus-
ing treatment that it assumed would apply in the "right to die" context,
21
the Court did not address whether this liberty interest was "fundamen-
tal," thereby requiring strict scrutiny of government attempts to abridge
it. The Court upheld the constitutionality of Missouri's requirement of
clear and convincing evidence supporting a patient's desire to refuse
life-sustaining treatment or nourishment. 22 The state's interest in pro-
longing life was found to be sufficiently important to justify a clear and
convincing evidence standard.23 This standard, however, is merely a
procedural requirement for exercise of the liberty interest assumed by
the Court to be protected by due process. Such a standard still allows
patient's desire to refuse life-sustaining treatment or nourishment if she were in a vegetative state.
See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283. The Cruzan Court, however, declined to determine whether a state
might be required to defer to the decision of a surrogate appointed by the patient even if the
patient's wishes were clearly expressed. See id. at 287 n.12; see also id. at 289 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (expressing view that duty to defer to surrogate "may well be constitutionally
required"). Nancy Cruzan had not left any written instructions regarding her care in the event of
incompetency, and the Missouri Supreme Court had found testimony concerning her oral
statements on the issue to be insufficiently clear to establish her intentions. See id. at 268. In
addition, Cruzan had not, either orally or in writing, appointed a surrogate decisionmaker. As a
result, the case presented no occasion for the Court to consider the question.
20. See ARTHUR S. BERGER, DYING & DEATH IN LAW & MEDICINE 113-16 (1993); ALAN
MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 316-21 (1989); BARBARA A. WEINER & ROBERT M. WE=rSTEIN,
LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 299 (1993); John W. Parry, The Court's Role in
Decisionmaking Involving Incompetent Refusals of Life-Sustaining Care and Psychiatric
Medications, 14 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. RE.P. 468, 474 (1990); Perling, supra note
15, at 205, 219; Gary N. Sales, The Health Care Proxy for Mental Illness: Can it Work and
Should We Want it To?, 21 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 161, 162-63 (1993).
21. See supra note 15.
22. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
23. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
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the right to be exercised, and does not substantially burden it; the stan-
dard merely requires that exercise of the right be clearly expressed.
There is no suggestion in the Court's opinion that, as a matter of
substantive due process, the state's interest in prolonging life could be
invoked to justify a total infringement on the patient's right to decline
treatment. Indeed, language in several more recent Supreme Court opin-
ions seems to suggest that the right to refuse treatment, assumed to exist
in Cruzan, may be fundamental. For example, in its 1992 decision in
Foucha v. Louisiana,24 the Court labeled the liberty interest in avoiding
involuntary psychiatric hospitalization fundamental. In Riggins v.
Nevada,25 the Court, in dicta, suggested the need for a strict scrutiny
approach to measuring the constitutionality of involuntary administra-
tion of antipsychotic medication in the criminal pretrial and trial context.
Thus, if an individual objects to hospitalization or intrusive treatment
through an advance directive instrument, the liberty interest asserted
may be considered a fundamental constitutional right, requiring strict
judicial scrutiny of state attempts to invade it.26 In other words, the
liberty interest in using advance directive instruments that the Court rec-
ognized in Cruzan takes on new importance when viewed in the light of
these two more recent decisions. These developments suggest that the
Constitution leaves decisions regarding medical treatment and hospitali-
zation presumptively to the individual, rather than the state.
This principle should also apply to advance decisionmaking con-
cerning treatment that is not life prolonging. Cruzan suggests that a
patient possesses a due process right to choose whether to accept or
reject medical treatment. Thus, a competent expression of the patient's
desires should be respected even if the patient is incapacitated and the
state asserts a parens patriae interest in promoting and protecting the
patient's best interests. 27  The patient's clearly expressed interest in
choosing whether to discontinue life-sustaining treatment or nourish-
24. 504 U.S. 71, 80, 86 (1992).
25. 504 U.S. 127, 133, 136 (1992); see Bruce J. Winick, New Directions in the Right to
Refuse Mental Health Treatment, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 205, 225 (1993).
26. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (stating that if a requirement
upheld by a state "significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be
imposed unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to
effectuate only those interests.").
27. Under their historic parens patriae power, state's may act in the best interest of those
incapacitated by age or mental illness. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 296 (1982); see also
JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 6 (1986) (analyzing parens patriae power); Bruce J. Winick,
Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L.
REv. 15, 16 & n.3 (1991) [hereinafter Competency for Treatment] (discussing scope of
government's parens patriae power); Bruce J. Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy
and Research, 65 MINN. L. REv. 331, 374 (1981) (examining government's parens patriae power
to make decisions for those who are unable to make decisions for themselves); Note,
[Vol. 51:57
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ment, which Cruzan suggested would be superior to the state's parens
patriae interest in prolonging life, would seem as strong or stronger than
the state's parens patriae interest in administering treatment to a patient
whose life is not at risk. Given the finality of death, honoring a patient's
decision to discontinue life-sustaining treatment would totally frustrate
the state interest in preserving life. By contrast, honoring a patient's
decision to reject treatment that is not itself necessary to keep the patient
alive still leaves open other ways in which the state may attempt to
achieve its parens patriae interest in promoting individual health,
including future attempts by the state to persuade or induce the patient to
accept treatment thought to be beneficial.28 As a constitutional matter,
competent patients are more entitled to make decisions concerning their
own health than the state is.29 The state's parens patriae interest, how-
ever, might allow the state to insist on treatment for an incompetent
patient who has not expressed a previous competent desire concerning
treatment, if a surrogate decisionmaker believes such treatment is in the
patient's best interest. But when a patient expressed a preference while
he was competent, the state's parens patriae interests generally would
seem insufficient to outweigh the patient's prior judgment about his or
her own best interests.3 °
Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il1, 87 HAv. L. REv. 1190, 1207-22
(1974) [hereinafter Civil Commitment].
28. Because the advance directive instrument ordinarily will not become effective until the
individual becomes incompetent. The question may be raised whether the individual would be
competent to change his mind about treatment. Competence, of course, is more a normative than
a descriptive concept, and can be defined differently for different purposes. I have previously
argued that competency to assent to treatment, particularly treatment in accordance with the
recommendation of a clinician having a fiduciary duty to the patient, should require less in the
way of decisionmaking ability than competency to object to treatment. See Winick, Competency
for Treatment, supra note 27; see also infra text accompanying note 118. Competence is difficult
to assess and fluctuates over time. When an individual whose competence is in doubt seeks to
assent to treatment his clinician recommended and the individual previously assented to the
treatment in an advance directive instrument, we can treat the instrument as controlling without
ascertaining competence. When an instrument rejects treatment, however, if the individual
subsequently agrees to treatment, we may conclude that he possesses sufficient competence to
change his mind. Even if he is only barely competent, his present choice should take precedence
over his former choice expressed in the instrument. When, on the other hand, he continues
objecting to treatment, we should respect his refusal without assessing his competence, because,
even if he is incompetent, his prior objection is legally effective.
29. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 67-
70 (1979); Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VIL. L.
REv. 1705, 1755-71 (1992).
30. See Winick, Competency for Treatment, supra note 27, at 19 (noting that, although
mental illness may impair competency, mentally ill persons often have a significant capacity for
rational thought); see also ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION
102 (DHEW Pub. No. (ADM) 76-176, 1976); THOMAS S. SzAsz, THE THERAPEUTIC STATE:
PSYCHATRY IN THE MIRROR OF CuRREr EvENTS 99 (1984); Perling, supra note 15, at 195;
Thomas S. Szasz, The Psychiatric Will: A New Mechanism for Protecting Persons Against
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There is one troubling exception to this general approach.
Although a competent patient is presumptively better able to identify his
or her best interests than is the state, the patient may be unable to antici-
pate changes in circumstances that might occur when the patient is
incompetent. Incompetence-cognitive impairment caused by physical
trauma, organic brain disorder, or mental illness-may be long lasting.
During a period of incompetence, treatment options not available when
the patient executed an advance directive instrument may arise that
would clearly be in the patient's best interest. Because the patient is
incompetent, the state would be unable to persuade or induce the patient
to change his or her mind and accept such a treatment. In this circum-
stance, the state's ability to assess the patient's best interest may be
superior to that of the patient, even though the patient was competent at
the time he or she made the directive.
Some commentators argue that this dilemma should render advance
directive instruments ineffective once the patient becomes incompe-
tent. 3' In my view, however, this response goes too far. In the many
cases in which treatment options have not materially changed, the
patient's prior expression of preference should be respected even if the
state or a surrogate decisionmaker thinks that another treatment would
be best for the patient. However, in those cases in which treatment
options or other circumstances have changed in a way that could not
reasonably have been foreseen, there are ways of dealing with the prob-
lem that would not compromise the instrument's effectiveness alto-
gether. I discuss these approaches in Part V, which deals with
amendment and revocation of advance directive instruments.32
The foregoing analysis of Cruzan and its implications suggests that
advance determinations concerning hospitalization and treatment made
by mental patients during periods of competency generally should be
enforceable. 33 Although Cruzan did not deal with the mentally ill's abil-
"Psychosis" and Psychiatry, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 762, 766-67 (1982); Bruce J. Winick,
Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Response to
Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 585 (1995).
31. Professor Rebecca Dresser is the leading proponent of this view. See Rebecca Dresser,
Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28
ARIZ. L. REv. 373 (1986) [hereinafter Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients]; Rebecca Dresser,
Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 609 (1994)
[hereinafter Missing Persons]; Rebecca Dresser, Relitigating Life and Death, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 425
(1990) [hereinafter Relitigating].
32. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
33. See In re Rosa M., 597 N.Y.S.2d 544, 545 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (upholding patient's advance
directive refusal of electroconvulsive therapy); Paul S. Appelbaum, Advance Directives for
Psychiatric Treatment, 42 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 983, 984 (1991); Deborah S.
Pinkney, Advance Directive Could Give Mentally Ill More Treatment Control, AM. MED. NEWS,
Dec. 16, 1991, at 3.
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ity to engage in future health-care decisionmaking, mental illness should
not be distinguished from physical illness in this regard, at least not
when the individual in question is competent at the time the advance
directive instrument is executed. Is the existence of mental illness per se
incompatible with such competence? Although mental illness some-
times impairs competency to process information and make rational
decisions, it often does not do so. 34 Those who are mentally ill often
have a significant capacity for normal and rational thought and behav-
ior.35 Mental illness, even a severe mental illness like schizophrenia,
simply cannot be equated with incompetence to make rational treatment
decisions.36 The due process liberty interest recognized in Cruzan there-
fore should be equally applicable to mental patients and medical
patients. It should apply to all "persons," the term used in the Due Pro-
cess Clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to describe
the beneficiaries of their protection against governmental deprivation.37
34. "The mere presence of psychosis, dementia, mental retardation, or some other form of
mental illness or disability is insufficient in itself to constitute incompetence." PAUL S.
APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTmEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 220 (2d
ed. 1991); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS xxiii (4th ed. 1994) ("[A]ssignment of a particular diagnosis does not imply a specific
level of impairment or disability.").
35. See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341-42 (N.Y. 1986); Stephen J. Morse, Crazy
Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 527, 540,
572-77, 632-35 (1978); Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First
Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 54 (1989).
36. See Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study.
III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
149, 171 (1995) (comparing treatment decisionmaking of hospitalized mental patients and
medically ill patients and non-ill community groups, finding that nearly half of schizophrenic
patients and 76% of clinically depressed patients performed in an "'adequate' range ... across all
decision-making measures," and that a significant portion performed at or about the mean for
persons without mental illness); Karen McKinnon et al., Rivers in Practice: Clinicians'
Assessments of Patients' Decision-Making Capacity, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1159,
1159 (1989) ("Clinical evidence suggests that despite alterations in thinking and mood, psychiatric
patients are not automatically less capable than others of making health care decisions."); David
A. Soskis, Schizophrenic and Medical Inpatients as Informed Drug Consumers, 35 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 645, 645 (1978) (finding individuals with schizophrenia to be more aware of
risks and side effects of their medications than medical patients, but medical patients to be more
informed about the name and dose of their medication and of their diagnosis); David A. Soskis &
Richard L. Jaffe, Communicating with Patients About Anti-Psychotic Drugs, 20 COMPREHENSIVE
PSYCHIATRY 126 (1970) (understanding in both groups equal); Barbara Stanley, Informed Consent
in Treatment and Research, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 63, 77-78 (Irving B. Weiner
& Allen K. Hess eds., 1987) (reviewing studies finding little difference between psychiatric and
medical patients' comprehension of consent information); Barbara Stanley et al., Preliminary
Findings on Psychiatric Patients as Research Participants: A Population at Risk?, 138 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 669, 671 (1981) (finding no differences between mental and medical patients'
willingness to expose themselves to high-risk, hypothetical studies); see also Bruce J. Winick, The
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Legal and Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL'Y & L. 137, 140 (1996) (discussing study by Grisso & Appelbaum, supra).
37. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (construing
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Both those suffering from mental illness and those suffering from life-
threatening medical conditions may exercise this liberty interest when
they are competent, even though they may be incompetent when their
choice is given effect. Cruzan's deference to state law concerning the
degree of clarity required to render advance directive instruments
enforceable3" suggests that states will enjoy wide latitude in defining
competency for this purpose39 and in deciding on the procedures neces-
sary for its determination. Within these limits, however, the constitu-
tional right to engage in advance treatment decisionmaking, recognized
in Cruzan, should apply with equal force to individuals with mental
illness.
In light of Cruzan's implications, both patients with mental illness
who have been restored to competency through hospitalization or treat-
ment, and those who have never been incompetent, should be
encouraged to determine in advance how they would like to be treated
during future periods of incompetency. For example, those who had a
positive hospital experience, but were subjected to involuntary commit-
ment proceedings that they found to be demeaning, might agree in
advance to voluntary hospitalization should they again experience severe
"persons" broadly). For Supreme Court recognition that persons with mental illness have a
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted mental health treatment, see
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133-34 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22
(1990).
38. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
39. For an analysis of differing standards for determining a patient's competency to make
treatment decisions, see THOMAS Gisso, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS
AND INSTRUMENTS (1986); Winick, Competency for Treatment, supra note 27. Virtually all states
employ a statutory presumption in favor of competence, applicable even to mental patients
committed to psychiatric hospitals under the parens patriae power because they are incompetent
to appreciate their need for hospitalization. See SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW 375, 406-07 tbl.7.2 (3d ed. 1985); Catherine E. Blackburn, The
"Therapeutic Orgy" and the "Right to Rot" Collide: The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs
Under State Law, 27 Hous. L. REV. 447, 471-72 nn.87-88 (1990); Winick, Competency for
Treatment, supra note 27, at 22-23 & n.19, 35-37. As a result, individuals executing advance
directive instruments should be presumed to be competent to do so. See In re Rosa M., 597
N.Y.S.2d 544, 545 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (presuming involuntarily committed civil patient who received
electroconvulsive therapy is competent to execute advance directive). In view of our society's
historic commitment to principles of individual autonomy, see Winick, Competency for
Treatment, supra note 27, at 35-37; Winick, supra note 29, it would seem unlikely that states
would depart from the general presumption of competency in the case of the advance directive
instrument. See Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § I l(b), 9 U.L.A. 243 (Supp. 1996) (applying a
presumption in favor of competency to execute an advance directive instrument; OR. REv. STAT.
§ 127.575 (1995) (presuming instrument is valid). When competency is presumed, the burden
falls on those who are questioning the advance directive instrument's validity on the basis that the
individual who executed it was incompetent at the time. In defining incompetency, our
commitment to the principle of autonomy calls for a narrow definition that respects individual
self-determination in all cases but those in which the decision made is clearly the product of
mental illness. See Winick, supra note 29, at 1732-35.
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symptoms.4" Similarly, those who strongly disliked a particular medica-
tion or other treatment, such as electroconvulsive therapy, might insist
that they never again be subjected to it, or that a specified alternative
treatment be used instead.4 To satisfy the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard approved in Cruzan, which some states may apply in the
mental health context, patients should be encouraged to express their
desires clearly and in writing.42 In addition, they may wish to designate
an appropriate health-care surrogate or proxy to assist in effectuating
their desires. Some patients, particularly those whose competence to
execute an advance directive instrument is in question, may wish to have
their execution of the written instrument witnessed or even .videotaped,
and to recite for the witnesses or the tape the reasons for their choices.
In the absence of an expressed desire, a state's parens patriae civil com-
mitment statute or involuntary treatment authority presumably would
prevail, should the patient become incompetent, allowing the state to
determine what the patient would have wished if he or she was
competent.
In this sense, the advance health-care directive bears a strong anal-
ogy to the last will and testament.43 Just as individuals have the ability
to dispose of their property upon death by making a will expressing their
intentions, patients may control future health-care treatment through the
use of advance directive instruments. When a competent individual exe-
cutes a will, his or her estate will be disposed of in accordance with the
40. See Steven K. Hoge, The Patient Self-Determination Act and Psychiatric Care, 22 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 577, 583-84 (1994); Marilyn K. Rosenson & Agnes M. Kasten,
Another View of Autonomy: Arranging for Consent in Advance, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 1
(1991).
41. See Rosa M., 597 N.Y.S.2d at 544 (upholding advance directive by patient who
previously experienced electroconvulsive therapy and executed advance directive stating "I am
withdrawing my consent to electroconvulsive therapy and am refusing any more treatments with
this procedure.").
42. One court has defined the clear and convincing evidence standard in the context of
advance directive instruments as follows:
[T]he "clear and convincing" evidence standard requires proof sufficient to persuade
the trier of fact that the patient held a firm and settled commitment to the
termination of life supports under the circumstances like those presented. As a
threshold matter, the trier of fact must be convinced, as far as is humanly possible,
that the strength of the individual's beliefs and the durability of the individual's
commitment to those beliefs makes a recent change of heart unlikely. The
persistence of the individual's statements, the seriousness with which those
statements were made and the inferences, if any, that may be drawn from the
surrounding circumstances are among the factors which should be considered.
In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988) (citation omitted). For
criticism of the clear and convincing evidence standard in the advance directive context on the
basis that it is almost impossible to satisfy, see Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102
HARv. L. REv. 375 (1988).
43. See MEIsEL, supra note 20, at 312-13; see also SzAsz, supra note 30, at 91-92.
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will's directions, even if the individual subsequently becomes incompe-
tent to execute or amend the will. Absent a will, state law on intestate
succession applies. In the mental health context, by analogy, the state's
parens patriae hospitalization or treatment law and practice should pre-
vail in the absence of an advance directive concerning hospitalization or
treatment. When patients express their desires in such instruments, how-
ever, they generally should be effective in determining future hospitali-
zation or treatment during subsequent periods of incompetency. State
parens patriae hospitalization or treatment law can thus be seen as a
default rule that applies only in the absence of a clearly expressed
advance directive.
III. LIMITS ON ENFORCEABILITY
A. The Distinction Between Advance Directives Electing Treatment
and Those Rejecting It
The analogy to the last will and testament also suggests that while
many provisions in the advance health care directive will be enforceable,
some will not be. Just as provisions in a will that violate public policy
will not be enforced, 44 provisions in an advance directive should be inef-
fective to the extent they seek, for example, to elect drugs that are
unlawful or unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, treat-
ments that exceed the patient's financial resources, or treatment modali-
ties that are banned by the professional ethics of the practitioner in
question. Although an individual's right to refuse treatment that the
state wishes to impose may be fundamental, 45 the right to obtain a par-
ticular treatment that the state forbids may not be entitled to as much
constitutional protection.46 As a result, the state may enjoy wider lati-
tude in regulating directive instruments that elect certain forms of treat-
ment than those that reject a particular form of treatment. Current
statutes and case law dealing with advance directives do not draw this
distinction, but there may be good reasons for doing so, and the distinc-
tion may already be reflected in existing practice.
Both tort law principles and professional ethics require that the
treating clinician obtain the patient's informed consent.47 To satisfy this
44. See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WiLLs, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 86-93 (1988).
45. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
46. See United States v. Richardson, 588 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
947 (1979) (rejecting challenge to ban on Laetrile, a drug sought by some cancer patients); cf.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (distinguishing
negative liberties from positive liberties and suggesting greater constitutional protection for the
former); Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969)
(distinguishing positive and negative liberty).
47. See, e.g., PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT 23 (1987); RUTH R. FADEN &
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requirement, the clinician must disclose to the patient the risks and bene-
fits of the treatment in question and alternative treatments, and the
patient must provide a competent consent." Only in some cases will the
same clinician who counseled the patient at the time the advance direc-
tive was executed also be involved in the patient's treatment at a later
time when the patient is incompetent. This raises several serious
problems. A treating clinician who has never previously been involved
with the patient might be reluctant to administer the treatment selected
in the advance directive. Even if the treating clinician believes the treat-
ment is clinically appropriate, he or she will not have made the neces-
sary disclosure to the patient concerning risks, benefits, and alternatives,
and as a result, may feel vulnerable to a tort suit or ethics charges. 9
Moreover, even if the treating clinician fully disclosed to the patient
when the patient executed the directive instrument, material facts con-
cerning risks, benefits, and alternative therapies may have changed, rais-
ing serious questions concerning the validity of the prior consent.
These are problems that will not arise in cases in which the advance
directive instrument seeks to decline a specified treatment rather than
elect one. The arguments in favor of the enforceability of advance
directives denying treatment may therefore be considerably more com-
pelling. Because advance directives denying treatment are likely to have
greater constitutional protection, states will enjoy considerably wider
latitude in regulating advance directives that elect rather than reject
treatment. Indeed, because the liberty interest in electing a particular
treatment, although protected by due process,50 probably will not be
considered fundamental, state regulation will presumably be tested only
under the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis standard. Thus, a state
statute permitting clinicians to refuse to provide treatment elected in an
advance directive instrument if they concluded it would be therapeuti-
cally inappropriate, inconsistent with professional ethics, or in violation
of the requirements of informed consent,51 would probably survive con-
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 23 (1986); Charles L.
Sprung & Bruce J. Winick, Informed Consent in Theory and Practice: Legal and Medical
Perspectives on the Informed Consent Doctrine and a Proposed Reconceptualization, 17 CRITICAL
CARE MED. 1346 (1989).
48. See sources cited supra notes 24-26.
49. This concern will be alleviated by increasingly common statutory provisions immunizing
providers from tort liability or charges of unethical conduct for complying with patients'
directives. See infra note 52.
50. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § 7. 9 U.L.A. 239 (Supp. 1996):
(e) A health-care provider may decline to comply with an individual instruction or
health-care decision for reasons of conscience. A health-care institution may
decline to comply with an individual instruction or health-care decision if the
instruction or decision is contrary to a policy of the institution which is expressly
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stitutional challenge. Similarly, a statute immunizing clinicians from
liability for violation of the informed consent requirement when, in good
faith, they provide treatment to an incompetent patient in accordance
with his or her advance directive52 would also seem constitutional.
Although statutes such as these would vest clinicians with a considerable
degree of discretion, given the complex clinical and ethical issues that
varied circumstances are likely to create, such discretion appears more
appropriate and cost efficient than a system relying on administrative or
judicial decisionmaking. Even when a competent patient seeks treat-
ment, clinicians may refuse to provide it if they feel it to be clinically
inappropriate or unethical under the circumstances. Advance directives
should not change this feature of clinical practice.
If immunizing statutes such as these are adopted, as we should
anticipate they will be in view of the political power that the profes-
sional groups affected usually enjoy at the state legislative level, they
will facilitate the use of advance directive instruments for those with
mental illness. Obviously, clinicians will feel most comfortable honor-
ing an advance directive electing a particular treatment when they have
had a long-standing relationship with the patient and have developed the
advance directive with him or her. When the patient is unknown to the
clinician, the clinician's willingness to comply with an advance selection
of treatment will vary with the clinician's assessment of its clinical
appropriateness in light of alternative therapies. To ensure that his or
her interests and preferences are promoted, it may be advisable for the
patient to supplement his or her advance directive instrument with
health-care proxies to trusted friends or relatives. These designees can
not only advocate the patient's interests and preferences, but also pro-
vide an additional informed consent as the patient's surrogate, alleviat-
ing many of the clinician's concerns, including those relating to
potential liability.
B. The Distinction Between the State's Police Power and Its Parens
Patriae Power
The above discussion suggests a number of limitations on the
based on reasons of conscience and if the policy was timely communicated to the
patient or to a person then authorized to make health-care decisions for the patient.
(f) A health-care provider or institution may decline to comply with an individual
instruction or health-care decision that requires medically ineffective health care or
health care contrary to generally accepted health-care standards applicable to the
health-care provider or institution.
52. Most state statutes, including those dealing explicitly with advance directives for persons
with mental illness, provide for such immunity. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 327F-13
(Michie 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 11-112 (1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.555(3) (1995).
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enforceability of advance directive instruments that elect a particular
treatment. Those seeking to reject a particular form of treatment or
treatment altogether, however, will enjoy a higher degree of enforceabil-
ity. When the rejected treatment is sufficiently intrusive that the
patient's right to reject it is deemed fundamental, 3 the advance directive
will generally be upheld as long as the state interest in providing treat-
ment is grounded solely in its parens patriae power. Absent a court
order revoking or amending it,54 an advance directive executed while the
patient was in a competent state should be respected, just as under
Cruzan, a living will declining life-prolonging treatment or nourishment
would be.
By contrast, an advance directive would not control in instances in
which the state's interest in hospitalization or treatment is grounded in
its police power," rather than its parens patriae power. Just as a will
provision that violated public policy would be unenforceable,56 a mental
health advance directive refusing the hospitalization or treatment
required to prevent the patient's suicide or harm to others would be
unenforceable. The subordination of the patient's liberty interest in
engaging in future mental health-care decisionmaking to the state's
police power is no different than the state's interest in public health or
safety overriding the desire of a patient suffering from infectious tuber-
culosis who refuses treatment or quarantine,57 or the desire of an indi-
vidual who refuses compulsory vaccination designed to prevent the
spread of an epidemic.5 8 The autonomy justification for respecting and
enforcing advance mental health directives is insufficient to outweigh
53. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
54. See infra Part V.
55. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (suggesting that state's police power
interest in preventing harm to other inmates or staff in a jail and in restoring and maintaining a
defendant's competency to stand trial would justify forced antipsychotic medication that was
medically appropriate and the least intrusive means of accomplishing these goals); Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (upholding state's authority to forcibly administer antipsychotic
drugs to a prisoner to protect safety of other prisoners and prison staff); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d
266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 656 (1st Cir. 1980) (en banc),
vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). The
state's police power interest in preventing suicide is a traditional justification for civil
commitment. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567, 572 (Iowa 1995);
Rodriguez v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp. 1173, 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Civil Commitment,
supra note 27, at 1222-45 (analyzing police power and the basis for involuntary hospitalization).
56. See McGOVERN ET hAL., supra note 44, at 86-93.
57. The state possesses a limited quarantine power under which those with tuberculosis may
be hospitalized to protect the public health. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 392.56 (1995); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2120 (McKinney 1996).
58. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (holding that state's police power
interest in preventing epidemic outweighed competent individual's asserted right to refuse
compulsory vaccination for smallpox).
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the state's interest in protecting those who the patient could harm. Just
as the state would be able to hospitalize or treat dangerous, although
competent mental patients over their present objections, 59 the state
would be able to hospitalize or treat mental patients who are both dan-
gerous and incompetent over the objections they expressed in the past.
Thus, in the future, the right to refuse treatment question may, in
part, be answered through the use of advance directive instruments.
Statutory commitment or involuntary treatment laws applied to accom-
plish state police power interests will prevail over patient choices made
in such instruments. However, when applied in the parens patriae con-
text, these laws generally will prevail only in the absence of such
instruments.
C. The Distinction Between Instruction Directives and
Health-Care Proxies
Individuals may engage in advance health-care decisionmaking in
two different ways. First, they may execute advance directive instru-
ments (what I shall call "instruction directives"), specifying in detail
how particular health-care decisions shall be made in the event of future
incompetence. 60  Second, they may execute health-care proxies, a type
of durable power of attorney in which they designate another person to
act on their behalf in the event of future incompetence.6' Should these
59. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding that state's police power
interest in protecting other prisoners and staff outweighed competent prisoner's desire not to take
antipsychotic medication); Civil Commitment, supra note 27, at 1222-28 (analyzing state's police
power as a justification for involuntary hospitalization). Under this analysis - a police power
interest, but not a parens patriae interest, would trump an individual's advance directive
instrument refusing hospitalization or treatment - the individual's advance refusal would prevail
only when the state's justification for the involuntary intervention is grounded exclusively in its
parens patriae power.
The state's rationale for involuntary hospitalization and treatment does not always fall neatly
into either the police power or the parens patriae categories. Sometimes a patient's situation
invokes both justifications.
60. See, e.g., Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § 2(a), 9 U.L.A. 224 (Supp. 1996) ("An adult
or emancipated minor may give an individual instruction. The instruction may be oral or written.
The instruction may be limited to take effect only if a specified condition arises."). "Every state
now has legislation authorizing the use of some sort of advance health-care directive. All but a
few states authorize what is typically known as a living will." Id. at prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 220.
61. See, e.g., Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § 2(b), 9 U.L.A. 224-25:
An adult or emancipated minor may execute a power of attorney for health care,
which may authorize the agent to make any health-care decision the principal could
have made while having capacity. The power must be in writing and signed by the
principal. The power remains in effect notwithstanding the principal's later
incapacity and may include individual instructions. Unless related to the principal
by blood, marriage, or adoption, an agent may not be an owner, operator, or




two mechanisms be treated differently by the law?62 Although both
should be legally effective ways63 of engaging in future health-care deci-
sionmaking, to some extent they deserve different treatment, and the
state will have somewhat more latitude in regulating the latter than the
former.
An individual may exercise his or her liberty interest in making
health-care decisions through either mechanism. 64  In the instruction
directive, the individual specifies what should be done, whereas in the
health-care proxy, the individual delegates this authority to another.
When the individual specifies what should be done in the event of future
incompetence, there is certainty concerning how the individual desires to
exercise his or her right. On the other hand, when the individual
appoints a designee to engage in surrogate decisionmaking, there is far
less certainty concerning whether the surrogate's decisions accurately
reflect the individual's desires. Except in situations in which a designee
provides guidance to the surrogate concerning how to act in specified
circumstances, 65 a health-care proxy does not insure that the surrogate
decisionmaker will decide the way the individual would have. Even
though the individual designated a close friend or relative presumed to
understand the individual's preferences as surrogate, the surrogate may
not truly understand the individual's preferences or may decide to pur-
sue his own view of the individual's best interest. Moreover, there may
be a conflict of interest between the surrogate and the individual. For
example, if the surrogate resides with a mentally ill individual, the dis-
tressing behavioral symptoms of mental illness may dispose the surro-
gate to prefer hospitalization, even if it is not in the individual's best
interests.66 Thus, the state will have a legitimate interest in policing the
health-care proxy process to ensure against conflicts of interest and other
abuses.67  When the individual has clearly articulated a choice in the
"Nearly all states have statutes authorizing the use of powers of attorney for health care." Id. at
prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 220.
62. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 n.12 (1990) (suggesting
that states treat the two mechanisms differently) (dictum); People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286, 296
(N.Y. 1984) (stating that the right to decline life-preserving treatment is personal, and, while the
individual may exercise it through an advance directive instrument or when he otherwise clearly
makes his wishes known, it may not be exercised on his behalf by a third party) (dictum); see also
In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 612 n.2 (N.Y. 1988) (citing statement in
Eulo, but noting that it was subsequently overruled by statute).
63. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.205(1)(a) (1995).
66. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 632 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. See Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (Ct. App. 1983) (requiring that
there be no evidence that family members acting as surrogate decisionmakers "were motivated in
their decisions by anything other than love and concern" for the patient); John F. Kennedy Mem'l
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matter, however, these state interests are absent.
When an individual has not articulated his or her preferences, the
state may have good reason to scrutinize proxy decisionmaking. This is
particularly true when the intervention in question-hospitalization or
intrusive treatment-can have a dramatic effect on the individual's wel-
fare. Deference to individual autonomy may make us reluctant to inter-
fere with an individual's own choice, even when we suspect it is
imprudent or foolish. 68 But when the individual's surrogate seeks to do
something that we suspect is not truly in the individual's best interest, an
added degree of scrutiny seems appropriate, particularly if the interven-
tion in question seems seriously detrimental. Although both advanced
directive instruments and health-care proxies are mechanisms for exer-
cising the liberty interest in health-care decisionmaking, the latter may
be subject to a higher degree of governmental regulation, limitation, and
oversight.69
Moreover, the instruction directive is a more basic assertion of the
right to make personal health-care decisions70 and, hence, is subject to a
higher degree of constitutional protection. There are certain constitu-
tional rights that individuals may not delegate to others. For example, a
citizen may exercise the right to vote, but a citizen may not delegate his
or her vote to others. An adult may decide to marry or divorce, but a
power of attorney delegating that authority to another would be unen-
forceable. A woman has a protected liberty interest in deciding whether
Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926-27 (Fla. 1984) (noting that "evidence of [surrogate
decisionmaker's] wrongful motives . . . may require judicial intervention"); Judith Areen, The
Legal Status of Consent Obtained from Families of Adult Patients to Withhold or Withdraw
Treatment, 258 JAMA 229, 232-33 (1987); see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN . § 24-7-8.1 (Michie 1995)
(requiring that patient's family act "in good faith."); Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § 5(i), 9
U.L.A. 235 (Supp. 1996) (disqualifying employees of long-term residential centers from being
proxies). Professor Rhoden has suggested that all proxy decisionmakers are inevitably influenced
by their own interests and values. Rhoden, supra note 42, at 392. Because these interests and
values might differ from those of the patient, proxy decisionmaking must be scrutinized in a way
that does not arise when the individual himself has provided an instruction directive. See Cruzan
v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 n.12 (1990):
The differences between the choice made by a competent person to refuse medical
treatment, and the choice madefor an incompetent person by someone else to refuse
medical treatment, are so obviously different that the State is warranted in
establishing rigorous procedures for the latter class of cases which do not apply to
the former class.
68. See Winick, Competency for Treatment, supra note 27, at 21 & n.17.
69. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 n.12.
70. See id. Nancy Rhoden would go further. In her view, instruction directives are the only
way in which the right to engage in treatment decisionmaking can be exercised. Unless the patient
has provided specific instructions to the designated proxy decisionmaker, Rhoden argues that the
decisionmaker is not truly exercising the patient's liberty interest, but only his or her own




to have an abortion, but she cannot delegate that authority to a surrogate
decisionmaker.7 1 In the criminal justice process, although defense coun-
sel may waive a variety of constitutional and trial-related rights on the
defendant's behalf,72 counsel may not make a decision about certain fun-
damental constitutional rights.. Only the defendant may decide whether
to plead guilty, to waive jury trial, to attend trial, and to testify at trial.73
Similarly, individuals may enjoy greater latitude in making personal
health-care decisions through an advance directive instrument than
through delegating power to a proxy decisionmaker; and the legislature
will possess greater authority to regulate health-care proxies than
advance directive instruments.
Do the above examples, prohibiting the delegation of certain per-
sonal rights to others, suggest that health-care decisions may not be dele-
gated to a proxy? Courts have not yet addressed this question,74 but
such delegations are increasingly allowed permitting such delegations in
this context. Indeed, the reasons for doing so are convincing, and the
situations in which delegation of decisionmaking is prohibited are distin-
guishable. With respect to the right to vote, there are political reasons,
including the wish to avoid an economic market in votes, that explain
why that right should not be delegable. Likewise, decisions about mar-
riage, divorce, and abortion are so personal and intimate and have such a
profound effect on the individual's life that the law may require the indi-
vidual to make the decision personally and not delegate it to another.
While health-care decisions also are personal and intimate, and may
71. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.113(1) (1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.540(5) (1995).
72. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 n.14 (1977); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976);
id. at 514-15 (Powell, J., concurring); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975); Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451-52 (1965); United States ex rel. Brown v. Warden, 417 F. Supp.
970, 972-73 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (collecting cases); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.6, at 501-06 (1985); Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to
Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REv. 921, 959-63 (1985).
73. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 751 (dictum) ("[T]he accused has the ultimate authority to make
certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury,
testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal .... "); Sykes, 433 U.S. at 93 n.1 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-5.2(a) (1993); LAFAVE & ISRAEL,
supra note 72, § 11.6, at 502-03; Winick, Reforming Incompetency, supra note 30, at 576;
Winick, supra note 72, at 959 n.181; see, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52-53 (1987)
(decision to testify); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (decision to plead guilty); Adams
v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (decision to waive jury trial). See
generally Timothy P. O'Neill, Vindicating the Defendant's Constitutional Right to Testify at a
Criminal Trial: The Need for an On-The-Record Waiver, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 809 (1990)
(contending that the fundamental nature of the right to testify necessitates a personal, on-the-
record waiver of that right at trial).
74. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 n.12 (1990) (raising the
question but not deciding it).
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have profound effects on the individual's life, the arguments in favor of
allowing delegation in this area are strong.
Our traditions reflect a wide range of permissible decisionmaking
by others in the area of health care. For example, parents make health-
care decisions for their minor children. 75  Families have traditionally
enjoyed an important role in health-care decisionmaking for ill, adult
family members.76 While the individual retains the authority to make
decisions on his own behalf, the individual frequently is allowed to des-
ignate a spouse or other close family member to exercise the individ-
ual's decisionmaking authority in the event illness destroys the
individual's competence.77 State laws recognize the general validity of
health-care proxies. 78  Even in the absence of a formal health-care
proxy, physicians will frequently consult close family members about
treatment decisions when the individual's ability to make them is
reduced.79
These health-care proxy decisionmaking traditions reflect ill indi-
viduals' need for decisionmaking assistance, and the reasonableness of
appointing family members or friends to provide that assistance. When
illness strikes, treatment decisions frequently must be made before the
individual is fully capable of making them. The right to make health-
care decisions-to elect or refuse treatment-sometimes must be exer-
cised through or with the assistance of another. When illness impairs
the ability to make decisions, delegation of health-care decisionmaking
authority to a trusted friend or relative is far preferable to decisionmak-
ing by the government.
The traditional use of health-care proxy decisionmaking, reflected
in legal and medical practice, suggests that states will not attempt to
75. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (relying on parents' traditional authority to make
health-care decisions for their minor children in upholding parents' ability to admit children to
mental hospitals and mental retardation facilities).
76. See generally Areen, supra note 67 (discussing the medical custom of physicians relying
on families to make medical decisions when the patient cannot speak for himself).
77. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Delegating the authority to
make medical decisions to a family member or friend is becoming a common method of planning
for the future."); Areen, supra note 67, at 230 (discussing medical practice and judicial and
statutory authorizations for families to make termination of life-prolonging treatment decisions for
incompetent patients).
78. See, e.g, ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-202 (Michie 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502
(1995); FLA. STAT. § 765.303 (1995); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-36-4-13(g)(2) (West Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE § 144A.7(1)(a) (1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:1299.58.1-.3(C) (West 1992); MINN. STAT. § 145B.01-.17 (Supp. 1995); TEX. HEALTH &
SA-FETY CODE ANN. § 672.003(d) (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1105, 1106 (Supp.
1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.065(1)(b)
(West 1992); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-102 (1995).
79. See Areen, supra note 67, at 229.
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prevent delegation of this authority to another in the mental health treat-
ment context. State legislatures, however, may seek to regulate it more
closely than health-care instruction directives, in which individuals spec-
ify what should be done in the event of future incompetence. The state,
for example, may wish to prohibit surrogate decisionmakers from elect-
ing certain types of experimental treatment, such as psychosurgery, 0 or
certain types of controversial treatment, such as electroconvulsive ther-
apy. 8 States may also limit surrogates' ability to civilly commit indi-
viduals to psychiatric hospitals.82 In addition, states may prohibit
individuals with conflicts of interest from exercising health-care proxies,
and impose fiduciary duties on individuals accepting such appointments.
Moreover, in the case of some treatments, legislatures may require that
health-care proxies not only name an individual as surrogate deci-
sionmakers, but also provide standards channeling the surrogates' exer-
cise of discretion. Such a limitation on surrogate discretion is not
unusual in American jurisprudence. In the law of agency, for example,
courts have sometimes reacted with skepticism when a general power of
attorney is relied upon as authorization to dispose of significant property
or to enter into a guarantee. 83 Courts construe corporate bylaw provi-
sions granting officers broad authority similarly.,, Courts often require
more specificity in the instrument to permit the inference that the princi-
ple intended his or her agent to exercise the power in question.8 5 Simi-
80. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.113(1) (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.540(3) (1995).
81. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.113(1) (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.540(2) (1995).
82. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.113(1) (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.540(1) (1995).
83. See Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right
to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAaN L. REV.
765, 861 n.470 (1989); see, e.g., Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Progressive Hous., Inc., 453 F. Supp.
1103, 1106-07 (D. Colo. 1978) (Holding the general power of attorney insufficient to authorize an
agent to execute a guaranty agreement binding the principal, the court noted that "representatives,
[dealing with the agent] as persons of ordinary prudence in business matters, should have perused
the instrument granting [the agent] a general power of attorney and should have insisted upon
more than was furnished by him as evidence of his authority to enter into the specific
transaction."); Gittings, Neiman-Marcus, Inc. v. Estes, 440 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969)
(dictum) (noting that a broad power of attorney authorizing an agent "to sell, transfer and convey
all lands that I may have in the said State of Texas, and generally to do and to perform all acts and
deeds for me and in my name concerning any and all property that I now own in said State of
Texas" was insufficient to authorize the agent to barter or exchange the principal's land).
84. See Winick, supra note 83, at 861 n.470; see, e.g., General Overseas Films, Ltd. v. Robin
Int'l, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 684, 691-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 718 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1983). In
General Overseas Films, Ltd., the court held that a bylaw provision granting a treasurer "power on
behalf of the Company to sign checks, notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of
indebtedness" did not authorize him to execute a guaranty binding the corporation. Id. at 691.
"[S]uch a contract is unusual and extraordinary and so not normally within the powers accruing to
an agent by implication, however general the character of the agency; ordinarily the power exists
only if expressly given." Id. at 692 (quoting 2A C.J.S. Agency § 181 (1979).
85. Demands for specificity can be seen as examples of "the policy of clear statement."
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1205-10 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
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larly, when administrative agencies rely upon a broad and general
legislative delegation for the authority to intrude upon fundamental con-
stitutional rights, courts often insist upon a more explicit statutory
authorization.86
The requirement that a clear statement of authority exist when seri-
ous consequences might ensue suggests that individuals should be as
specific as possible in the health-care proxy, either permitting or prohib-
iting certain treatment options or providing general standards to guide
the surrogate's decisionmaking. Such a limited health-care proxy can be
seen as a hybrid of the instruction directive and the traditionally unlim-
ited health-care proxy. 87 It will perhaps be the most enforceable instru-
ment for two reasons. First, courts will feel confident about the
individual's intentions and will, therefore, be more willing to defer to
them when they are confirmed by the individual's trusted designee. Sec-
ond, treatment providers might feel more comfortable with a process
that involves a surrogate, that is, another human being with whom to
share the difficult dilemmas that these situations may present.
The legislature may place certain treatment choices beyond the
authority of a surrogate when the individual has failed to either specify
them in the health-care proxy or specify appropriate standards governing
their choice. However, in general, it should give effect to such proxy
instruments. To the extent that the individual is able to think ahead
about the particular treatment choices that might arise, the individual
should specify his or her wishes in as much detail as possible in a health-
care directive instrument. By making their intentions clear, individuals
can avoid the possibility that courts will deny effectiveness to their
health-care proxies based on concern about whether they would have
made the same choice that their surrogate elects. While the legislature
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLrcs 156-69 (1962); WINICK, supra note 83, at 839-43
& 841 n.375.
86. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 308-09 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J., stating judgment of the Court); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 105-14
(1976); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275-76 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring); Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507-08 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958); see JAMES
D. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 83-85 (1978); Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 72-
73 (abr. ed. 1965); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.9, at 49-50 (2d ed. 1984);
TRIBE, supra note 14 § 5-17, at 365-66; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1680-81 (1975); Winick, supra note 83, at 853-64;
cf. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756-57 (1988) (holding that the
delegation of power to restrict First Amendment rights requires more than broad legislative
directives to guide the restricting authority); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,
150-51 (1969) (same).
87. See Hoge, supra note 40, at 578.
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may possess greater leeway in regulating health-care proxies, both prox-
ies and more specific health-care instruction directives should generally
be given effect in the mental health area.
IV. THE THERAPEUTIC VALUE OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVE INSTRUMENTS
In addition to avoiding the need for formal resolution of treatment
disputes and promoting autonomy values, the use of advance directive
instruments in the mental health context may have significant therapeu-
tic value. Merely contemplating the possibility of mental illness and
mental health treatment may cause some patients to take preventative
measures that may avoid the problem. Staring into the abyss of mental
illness may give people a clearer view of their present reality and an
incentive to change it when appropriate and possible, or to find better
ways of coping with it. It may also provoke people who suspect that
their problems might escalate to obtain treatment early, before their con-
dition gets out of hand. For some people, a little counseling may go a
long way, helping them to confront and resolve problems before they
become too serious.
People who previously have experienced mental illness may avoid
a recurrence of their problems by advance planning. Such planning will
cause them to reflect upon their desires in light of the hospitalization or
treatment they have already experienced and to take responsibility for
future decisionmaking. When patients have strong feelings about treat-
ment issues, their feelings generally should be respected. To the extent
patients do not have strong feelings, they can either leave their affairs to
the state, which will appoint a surrogate under its parens patriae power,
or designate a surrogate or proxy who is known to them and more capa-
ble than the state of representing their interests and preferences. The
assurance that an individual's strongly held feelings will be respected
can bring a measure of ease that can have beneficial effects; the concern
that such choices will be ignored can provoke stress, fear, and anxiety
that may exacerbate the individual's mental illness.
The very process of advance planning can have a number of posi-
tive therapeutic effects. Particularly for mental patients, who frequently
are infantilized by the treatment they receive in mental hospitals, assum-
ing responsibility for decisions vitally affecting them would be empow-
ering and have predictable beneficial effects.88 Indeed, the very process
88. A persistent criticism of mental hospitals is that, by taking over virtually all aspects of
patients' lives, they foster dependency, incompetency, learned helplessness, and a form of
institutional personality that is inconsistent with community readjustment. See ERVING GOFFMAN,
ASYLUMs: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 3-74
(1961); Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implications for
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of making decisions about the future might well have an impact on the
patient's future behavior and condition, that is, it may diminish the
chances of future incompetency.
The process of preparing an advance directive instrument also can
provide an important therapeutic opportunity that creative clinicians can
exploit. Preparing the instrument will focus the patient's attention on
future goals and how to attain them. The goal-setting effect-the find-
ing that the setting of concrete goals itself helps to bring about their
achievement-can be harnessed through the process of planning and
preparing the instrument. 89 Because the patient's goals will be clearly
set forth in writing and executed by the patient with a high degree of
formality in the presence of witnesses, the advance directive instrument
can be a particularly effective means of achieving the benefits of goal
setting. Therapists should become involved in preparing the instrument
because the process itself will provide an opportunity to engage the
patient and to eliminate potential resistance to treamtment in a context
that, precisely because it involves the future, may be less threatening to
the patient than the process of treatment decisionmaking concerning a
present problem.
An advance directive can function as an important safety valve for
the right-to-refuse-treatment issue. Patients who feel strongly about
determining the course of their treatment or about a specific treatment or
intervention will have the option of making advance decisions that in
general will effectuate their wishes. If they are able to do so in a way
that the law will honor, this will provide a degree of predictability that
can reduce stress and anxiety that might otherwise be devastating.
Being able to plan in advance about important matters, with the assur-
ance that those plans generally will be respected and effectuated, brings
a measure of ease that can permit the patient to pursue happiness and the
blessings of liberty in a way that the anxiety and fear produced by uncer-
Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 6, 19 & n.81 (1995); see also id. at 13-23
(analyzing negative effects on performance, motivation, and mood of labeling mental patients as
incompetent). By contrast, allowing patients to exercise self-determination and control over
important aspects of their lives, can improve their self-esteem and effective functioning. See
Winick, supra note 29, at 1755-71 (discussing the psychological value of choice).
89. Cf. Donald J. Campbell, The Effects of Goal-Contingent Payment on the Performance of
a Complex Task, 37 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 23, 23 (1984); Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan,
The Empirical Exploration of Intrinsic Motivational Processes, 13 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOL. 39, 58-61 (1980); Vandra L. Huber, Comparison of Monetary Reinforcers and
Goal Setting as Learning Incentives, 56 PSYCHOL. REP. 223 (1985); Daniel S. Kirschenbaum &
Randall C. Flanery, Toward a Psychology of Behavioral Contracting, 4 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REv.
598, 603-09 (1984); Edwin A. Locke et al., Goal Setting and Task Performance 1969-1980, 90
PSYCHOL. BULL. 125, 125-31 (1981); James R. Terborg & Howard E. Miller, Motivation,
Behavior, and Performance: A Closer Examination of Goal Setting and Monetary Incentives, 63
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 29, 30-31 (1978).
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tainty in such matters might well prevent. Patients may thereby be liber-
ated to maximize their potential for a healthy adjustment to life. Dealing
with such an important matter in an effective way also predictably will
allow the patient to experience feelings of self-esteem and self-efficacy
that can increase their decisionmaking capacity and their ability to per-
form in their chosen endeavors.90
Acting and being treated as self-determining individuals with a sig-
nificant measure of authority over their own fate, instead of as powerless
and incompetent victims of forces beyond their understanding and con-
trol, can be therapeutically advantageous to mentally ill patients.91 Res-
toration of mental patients to as high a degree of community functioning
as possible should be a significant goal of any sensible system of mental
hospitalization and treatment. This goal will be furthered by allowing
patients to exercise their decisionmaking capacity. By contrast, pater-
nalistic treatment can foster feelings of incompetency, reinforcing
expectations that might keep such patients from emerging from the
shadow of the psychiatric sick role.92
Moreover, recognizing that patients have the power to direct the
future course of their treatment will make psychiatrists and other clini-
cians negotiate with the patients about treatment, increasing the likeli-
hood that the patients will be treated with dignity and respect,93 rather
than paternalistically.94 Patients who are able to choose a course of
treatment in advance are likely to feel better about the treatment and are
more willing to comply with it, which can help to maximize the poten-
tial for therapeutic success.95 Even for those patients whose feelings
about future treatment are not strong enough to lead them to execute an
advance directive, the opportunity to do so, even though foregone, may
lead to greater acceptance of any therapeutic intervention subsequently
imposed by the state pursuant to its parens patriae power. Similarly,
failure by the individual to deal with the matter through an advance
90. See Winick, supra note 88, at 13 & n.49.
91. See Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Analysis, 17 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 99 (1994); Developments in the Law-
Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1519, 1643-55 (1990).
92. See JOHN S. STRAUSS & WILLIAM T. CARPENTER, JR., SCHIZOPHRENIA 128-29 (1981);
Donald N. Bersoff, Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations: The Supreme Court's Reckless
Disregard for Self-Determination and Social Science, 37 VLL: L. REv. 1569, 1571 (1992); Phil
Fennell, Inscribing Paternalism in the Law: Consent to Treatment and Mental Disorder, 17 J. L.
& Soc'y 29, 29 (1990); Winick, supra note 88, at 8, 12-13; see also JAY KATZ, THE SILENT
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 2 (1984).
93. See Winick, supra note 91, at 111-12, 114.
94. See id. at 111-12.
95. See id. at 115-16; see also KATZ, supra note 92, at 102-03; DONALD MEICHENBAUM &
DENNIS C. TURK, FACILITATING TREATMENT ADHERENCE: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDEBOOK 63, 71-
76, 84-85 (1987).
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directive, when that option is made available to him or her, may
decrease the individual's potential for subsequent resentment and psy-
chological reactance to a course of treatment later imposed through sur-
rogate decisionmaking.96 Psychological reactance is at its highest when
individuals feel that their decisionmaking authority has unfairly been
intruded upon.97 Being reminded that they had the ability to make other
arrangements, but neglected to do so, may help to diffuse such negative
reactions.
Thus, having the opportunity to engage in advance planning con-
cerning hospitalization and treatment may have significant therapeutic
benefits. The ability to be self-determining-to plan for the future, to
envision future contingencies and bring about those that are desired and
avoid those that are undesired, to set goals and see them achieved-is an
important aspect of mental health and self-esteem. Those suffering from
mental illness too frequently lack or have been denied this opportunity.
Such denial exacerbates their illness and intensifies feelings of
powerlessness, dependence, incompetence, and depression.
An additional therapeutic opportunity is presented if the hospital,
treatment facility, or therapist obtains the information set forth in the
advance directive instrument. It often may be difficult to obtain infor-
mation from or about a highly disturbed patient, particularly if the
patient is incompetent. The advance directive can supply the provider
with important information about the patient, the patient's treatment his-
tory, and the patient's treatment preferences and dislikes. This informa-
tion can be invaluable in the proper diagnosis of the patient's condition
and in devising an appropriate treatment plan.
Another advantage of advance directive instruments is their poten-
tial for avoiding formal adjudications of incompetency. Such adjudica-
tions are a form of deviance labeling that can produce seriously
detrimental social consequences and psychological damage.98 They are
often a prerequisite for exercise of the state's parens patriae power.99
96. See SHARON S. BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF
FREEDOM AND CONTROL 301 (1981).
97. See Nancy S. Bennett et al., Inclusion, Motivation, and Good Faith: The Morality of
Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 295, 297-99 (1993); Steven K.
Hoge et al., Patient, Family, and Staff Perceptions of Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission: An
Exploratory Study, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 281 (1993); John Monahan et al., Coercion to Inpatient
Treatment: Initial Results and Implications for Assertive Treatment in the Community, in
COERCION AND AGGREssivE COMMUNITY TREATMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN MENTAL HEALTH
LAW 13, 24, 27 (Deborah L. Dennis & John Monahan eds., 1996); Monahan et al., supra note 7, at
252-53.
98. See generally Winick, supra note 88 (describing antitherapeutic social and psychological
effects of incompetency labeling).
99. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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Individuals anticipating a future period in which their decisionmaking
capacity may be impaired may execute a formal instrument directing
how decisions will be made on their behalf in such an event or select a
trusted friend or relative to serve as a surrogate decisionmaker on their
behalf. An individual with mental illness may experience fluctuating
periods of impairment. Execution of either an instruction directive
instrument or a health-care proxy can avoid the necessity of a judicial
assessment of his or her competence. When the individual has executed
an instruction directive, that directive will not take effect until and
unless the individual becomes incompetent. However, as long as the
individual is able to articulate a present wish that is consistent with the
choice he or she articulated in the advance directive, no need would
exist to determine his or her competence. If the individual was presently
competent, his or her present choice would be honored; if the individual
was incompetent, the choice expressed in the instruction directive would
be honored. Because the same choice would be honored in either event,
an adjudication of competency would be unnecessary. Similarly, when
the individual has executed a health-care proxy designating a surrogate
decisionmaker to act on his or her behalf in the event of incompetence, if
the surrogate seeks to make a treatment decision that is identical to the
one that the individual is presently expressing, a formal determination of
competence would also be unnecessary. Thus, advance health-care
planning through the use of instruction directives or health-care proxies
can avoid the need for state coercion and incompetency adjudication,
with its accompanying adverse labeling effects.100
Thus, the use of advance directives can have many therapeutic
advantages for mentally ill individuals. It can help to avoid mental
health problems and can facilitate the treatment of those that occur. In
many cases it can render unnecessary a formal adjudication of incompe-
tence, thus avoiding the negative effects of incompetency labeling.
Hence, permitting mentally ill individuals to use advance directive
instruments not only promotes liberty, but can be seen as an example of
therapeutic jurisprudence."0 '
100. See Phyllis Solomon, Research on the Coercion of Persons with Severe Mental Illness, in
COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY TREATMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN MENTAL HEALTH
LAW 129, 142-43 (Deborah L. Dennis & John Monahan eds., 1996); Winick, supra note 88, at 39.
101. See generally DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JUISPRUDENCE (1991) (analyzing and illustrating law's role as a therapeutic agent); BRUCE J.
WINICK, THERApErTc JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW (forthcoming
1997); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B.
Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996) (illustrating application of therapeutic jurisprudence to a
wide spectrum of legal issues and containing commentary on this emerging approach to legal
policy analysis). For recent symposia on therapeutic jurisprudence, see Special Theme,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 1 (1995); Symposium, Therapeutic
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V. REVOCATION AND AMENDMENT OF ADVANCE
DIRECTIVE INSTRUMENTS
Perhaps the most intriguing problem with the use of advance direc-
tives in the mental health context arises when patients, who have exe-
cuted advance directives, either in favor of or against hospitalization or a
particular treatment, later seek to change their minds.' 0 2 Obviously, if
the change of mind occurs during a period of competency, the advance
directive instrument may be revoked or revised. Revocation may be
written, oral, or by physical destruction of the document.'0 3 Revision
may be accomplished by amendment or execution of a superseding
instrument.
Should it be possible for an individual to enter into an irrevocable
instrument? "Irrevocable," in this context, should be distinguished from
"durable." A durable power of attorney or health care-proxy is a grant of
authority to a surrogate that will survive the grantor's becoming incom-
petent.10 4  By comparison, an irrevocable instrument may not be
changed, even when the individual is competent. While people rarely
wish to bind themselves in ways that prevent them from changing their
minds, the advance directive for mental health care may present a situa-
tion in which some people wish to do precisely this.
Irrevocability, however, raises some troubling problems. Although
many individuals who execute advance directive instruments may never
expect to change them, time and experience sometimes bring new
insight that will make some wish to reevaluate the matter. Those who
fear that relatives or others may pressure them to revoke the instrument,
particularly one electing against hospitalization or treatment, may wish
to make them irrevocable. Ulysses, for example, entered into such a
contract when he ordered himself lashed to the mast because he knew
the sweet song of the sirens would otherwise be irresistible and would
lure him into treacherous waters. 10 5 Whether the waters awaiting those
individuals accepting mental hospitalization or mental health treatment
are as treacherous is a matter on which those who previously have
experienced them will differ. Most people will not wish to tie their
Jurisprudence: Restructuring Mental Disability Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993);
Symposium, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Bridging the Gap from Theory to Practice, 20 New Eng.
J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 243-344 (1994).
102. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY 38-47 (rev. ed. 1984); Audrey Macklin, Bound to Freedom: The Ulysses Contract
and the Psychiatric Will, 45 TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 37 (1987). See generally Rosenson & Kasten,
supra note 40; Rebecca S. Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists: A Legal and Policy Analysis of
the Voluntary Commitment Contract, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 777 (1982).
103. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.104(1) (1995).
104. See supra note 61.
105. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 214 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., 1963).
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hands in this manner, preferring instead to preserve their options. How-
ever, others who have had very negative hospitalization or treatment
experiences, will wish to nail the door shut. Should the law permit them
to do so? While they may be foolish to foreclose their options in this
way, isn't the essence of freedom the right to make foolish choices?
Although our law's strong commitment to individual autonomy
would favor leaving this matter, like many other matters dealing with
individual health, to the individual, there is a paradox here. Permitting
irrevocable, present choices compromises the making of choices in the
future. Freedom to enter into an irrevocable arrangement inevitably
conflicts with freedom to change one's mind. Autonomy principles thus
also support protecting the ability to make different choices in the future.
Even marriage and baptism into a particular religion-pledged to last
forever at the time-are not made absolutely irrevocable. People
change their minds about many things that they never thought they
would, and so the law permits divorce and religious conversion. Even
the Constitution can be amended. Thus, although the law may appropri-
ately allow people to make irrevocable advance directives that will sur-
vive their becoming incompetent, it should be reluctant to deny them the
opportunity, while competent, to change their minds. People should be
allowed to lock the door and hide the key, but not to throw it away.
One way to resolve this dilemma is to permit an "irrevocable"
advance directive instrument to be revoked or amended with judicial or
administrative approval when the individual is competent. Such
approval could be by application, with only the most cursory review,
much like the procedure for changing a name.10 6 The approval proce-
dure would function essentially as a check against coercion and changes
by obviously incompetent people who are being manipulated by others.
Only those individuals electing to execute such limited "irrevocable"
instruments would need to go through this procedure; those who exe-
cuted advance directives that were not made "irrevocable" would be per-
mitted to amend or revoke them at will.
Allowing this modified form of irrevocability would accommodate
the conflicting autonomy concerns while also serving therapeutic ends.
Inevitably, modes of mental hospitalization and treatment will improve.
Our knowledge about the causes and treatment of mental illness is rap-
idly developing,10 7 and new types of medication and other treatment,
106. A majority of states have enacted statutes prescribing the method by which an individual
may change his name. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 68.07 (1995). Generally, the individual files an
application with the appropriate court, which, unless there is a substantial reason to deny it, makes
an order granting the request.
107. See Bruce J.Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness,
1 PSCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 534, 564-65 (1995).
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more effective and with less adverse effects, hopefully will be devel-
oped. It would be a pity to allow the dead hand of a patient who had a
negative experience with an outmoded form of treatment to deny him or
her the opportunity to benefit from a new or newly improved treatment,
particularly if the patient wishes to try it and can make a competent
decision to do so. An iron-clad, irrevocable advance directive instru-
ment would have the antitherapeutic effect of foreclosing potentially
beneficial treatment options. This therapeutic consideration, although
not dispositive, argues for either free irrevocability of advance directives
or the modified form of irrevocability suggested earlier.
Therefore, allowing patients to opt for either free revocability or a
limited form of revocability subject to judicial or administrative scrutiny
would seem to be a sensible approach. The limited revocability (or
modified irrevocability) option could have the added advantage of serv-
ing as a useful hedge against coercion. The dialogue between the family
and a family member who suffers from mental illness, as well as that
between mental health professionals and the patient, sometimes crosses
the line between persuasion and coercion.1 °8 When a patient with strong
feelings against a particular mental health intervention has been brow-
beaten into submission, the judicial or administrative check may allow
the patient to resist such pressures. This procedure may also have thera-
peutic value. Patients who feel unfairly pressured into accepting treat-
ment they really wish to refuse will not do as well as those who feel they
have been persuaded to accept a treatment that is in their best inter-
ests.' °9 Although people sometimes need to be convinced to do things
that are in their best interest, coercing them into doing so may back-
fire. 110 By reducing the potential for coercion, the judicial or adminis-
trative approval process may allow patients to experience persuasion,
rather than compulsion, producing potentially positive therapeutic
effects.
Individuals contemplating advanced directive instruments thus
could be given the option either of electing an instrument that is freely
revocable or one that would require judicial or administrative approval
for revocation or modification. Those electing the latter presumably
would anticipate that their advance directive would remain unchanged,
but in the event they later thought otherwise, they could affect a change,
although only with judicial or administrative approval. Those opting for
the former would not need to obtain any approval for revocation or mod-
108. See Janet A. Gilboy & John R. Schmidt, "Voluntary" Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill,
66 Nw. U. L. REv. 429 (1971) (describing coercion in the voluntary hospital admission process);
Monahan et al., supra note 7, at 251.
109. See Monahan et al., supra note 97, at 2.
110. See generally BREHM & BREHM, supra note 96.
[Vol. 51:57
ADVANCE DIRECTIVE INSTRUMENTS
ification, but could simply revoke their prior directives or execute super-
seding instruments. This would be similar to the way individuals who
change their minds about dispositions made in a will may act. As long
as they are still competent, they may revoke or amend their wills as
often as they like.
Regardless of whether an individual selects the free or limited revo-
cability option, the question remains: If the individual's change of mind
occurs during a period of questionable competency or of incompetency,
how should the law respond? Under general principles, an incompetent
individual would be unable to revoke or revise a previously executed
advance directive instrument.11" ' But should the individual be bound to a
prior decision that may no longer be in his or her best interest? Perhaps
this is an area in which the state's present ability to ascertain an individ-
ual's best interest is superior to the individual's preference at the time
the advance directive instrument was executed.
This problem has led some commentators to suggest that advance
directives have only limited effectiveness. For example, Professor
Rebecca Dresser criticizes advance directive instruments on the ground
that honoring them precludes any reconsideration of patients' earlier
choices, even when those choices are detrimental to the patients' current
interests. 12  Dresser would consider patients' present interests more
worthy of protection than their previous preferences. In effect, she pre-
fers considerations of beneficence to the value of protecting patient
autonomy in the making of future decisions.
Professor Nancy Rhoden, on the other hand, has criticized
Dresser's position on the basis that it insufficiently values patient auton-
omy and precludes the use of living wills and other advance directive
instruments." 13 Professor Rhoden endorses the use of advance directive
instruments. She argues that decisionmaking relying on such instru-
ments, the patient's prior values and preferences gleaned from conversa-
tions with others, and family discretion is superior to an "objective"
determination of the patient's present best interests.
I prefer Rhoden's position to Dresser's, but I think there is an area
in which Dresser's criticism of the advance directive instrument is
appropriate. When treatment circumstances have changed in a way that
could not reasonably have been anticipated, there may be reason to pre-
fer the patient's present interests to a past instruction declining treat-
111. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.545 (1)(b) (1995) (prohibiting incompetent individuals from
revoking advance directive instruments).
112. See Dresser, Missing Persons, supra note 31, at 112; Dresser, Relitigating, supra note 31,
at 431, 433.
113. See Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Legal Objectivity, 68 N.C. L. REv. 845, 846 (1990);
Rhoden, supra note 42, at 411-16.
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ment. In what follows, I suggest a way of solving this dilemma without
denying general enforceability to advance directives.
If the patient envisioned the new circumstances at the time he or
she executed the instrument, the instrument provides the best evidence
of how he or she would wish to be treated should the anticipated circum-
stances materialize. In the absence of a police power interest sufficient
to trump the individual's prior expression of choice, 14 that expression-
assuming the individual was competent when he or she made it, of
course-should be respected, regardless of whether it would be incon-
sistent with the individual's best interests. There are a good many things
that competent people choose to do that are objectively not in their best
interests. People engage in risky behavior, like sky diving, cigarette
smoking, and buying derivatives, which may be detrimental to their
safety, health, or financial well-being. We do not, however, interfere
with their choices on the basis of beneficence. Deference for individual
autonomy mandates respect for competent decisions, even if they are
thought to be unwise or imprudent." 15 There may be reason to treat dif-
ferently situations in which an individual, because of present incompe-
tence, cannot change his mind. But to do so would deny the individual's
ability to make the decision for himself while in a competent state. As
long as the individual can anticipate the future consequences of his deci-
sion, we should not substitute our judgment for his own, even if we are
convinced that we are right and he is wrong.
If, on the other hand, the individual did not anticipate the changed
circumstances-the development of a new form of treatment or a means
of eliminating the adverse side effects of an old form of treatment, per-
haps-there may be good reason not to respect the individual's previ-
ously expressed direction. Indeed, if we are satisfied that had the
individual anticipated the changed circumstance, he or she would have
wished to modify the original direction in a particular way, then that
modification should be made. Careful drafting of advance directive
instruments that anticipate possible changes in circumstances and
express the individual's wishes in the event they occur would deal with
many of these problems. Lawyers and health-care professionals assist-
ing patients in the preparation of these instruments should thus help
patients anticipate various changes that might occur and decide how to
deal with them should they materialize.
When changed circumstances were not or could not have been
anticipated, how should the law respond? The law of wills provides a
useful analogy. Under the cy pres doctrine, a court may modify a will
114. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
115. See Winick, Competency for Treatment, supra note 27, at 21 & n.17.
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provision which, in light of unanticipated circumstances, seems incon-
sistent with the testator's intentions. 1 6 For example, a will provision
making a bequest to a now defunct organization or charity (e.g., the
League of Nations) may be modified by the probate court to have the
bequest go to another organization fulfilling a similar purpose (e.g., the
United Nations). Applying a form of the cy pres doctrine, courts and
administrative bodies can modify advance directive health-care instru-
ments in a similar way.'
1 7
In many cases, individuals who change their minds concerning pre-
viously executed advance directives will not clearly be either competent
or incompetent. How should the law deal with such cases of questiona-
ble competence? How should the law define competency in this context
and how should it be determined? In attempting to resolve this problem,
the distinction between patient assent and objection that I have proposed
elsewhere for defining competency may prove useful."'
In cases in which patients of questionable competency attempt to
change previously executed advance directive instruments in order to
choose therapist-recommended hospitalization or treatment, the law
should utilize a low threshold for defining competency and find patients'
assent to such an intervention sufficient to revoke prior directives.
Unless the patient's assent seems to be the product of hallucinations,
delusions, or outright irrationality, it should be accepted. As long as the
patient understands at a basic level that he or she has a problem, and
clearly and voluntarily chooses a recommended treatment intervention,
such as mental hospitalization or customary mental health treatment, that
concerned professionals believe to be in the patient's best interest, the
patient generally should be considered competent. 19 Although impaired
116. See, e.g., Yale Univ. v. Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304, 1305 (Conn. 1993); In re Estate of
Crawshaw, 819 P.2d 613, 620 (Kan. 1991); Franklin Found. v. Attorney Gen., 623 N.E.2d 1109,
1114 (Mass. 1993); In re Estes Estate, 523 N.W.2d 863, 870 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); In re
Gonzalez, 621 A.2d 94, 95-96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992); In re Will of Coffey, 590 N.Y.S.
2d 357 (App. Div. 1992); In re Estate of Wilson, 451 N.Y.S. 2d 891 (App. Div. 1982); see also
McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 44, at 333-38, 534-35, 550.
117. No case thus far appears to apply the cy pres doctrine in the advance health-care directive
context, perhaps because the use of such directives is still in its early stages.
118. See generally Winick, Competency for Treatment, supra note 27; Bruce J. Winick,
Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of
Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 169 (1991). I also have suggested use of the
distinction between assent and objection in the context of competency to stand trial in the criminal
process. Winick, Reforming Incompetency, supra note 30; Winick, supra note 72.
119. This narrow definition was recently recommended by the American Psychiatric
Association Task Force on Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization as a test for competency to
consent to voluntary hospital admission. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, TASK FORCE REP. No.
34, CONSENT TO VOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION 8 (1993); see Bruce J. Winick, How to Handle
Voluntary Hospitalization After Zinermon v. Burch, 21 ADMIN. & POL'Y MENTAL HEALTH 395,
402-04 (1994).
19961
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
by mental illness, these patients are able to express a preference that
does not on its face seem "crazy" or the product of a pathological delu-
sion. As long as the patient understands that he or she is seeking admis-
sion to a psychiatric hospital, that the treatment sought is for mental
illness, that care and treatment will be provided, and that release or dis-
continuation of treatment can occur if the patient again changes his or
her mind, the patient should be deemed competent. In this situation,
there would be a rebuttable presumption of competency. A formal
inquiry into competency would be unnecessary unless the patient's
assent appeared to be a product of outright irrationality, delusions, or
severe depression.120
Accordingly, unless specific evidence suggests that the choice
made was the product of mental illness, there should be no need for a
procedural determination of competence for an individual to revoke a
previously executed directive that rejects a treatment intervention now
sought in response to a therapist's recommendation.
This approach-defining competency differentially for assent and
objection, and applying a presumption in favor of competency in cases
of assent to a therapist's recommendation-would serve both autonomy
interests and therapeutic values. Indeed, permitting patients to choose a
therapeutic intervention recommended by their therapists would, accord-
ing to psychological theory, increase the potential that such an interven-
tion would be efficacious.1 21 Moreover, when the patient's assent is in
response to a therapist's recommendation, there is reasonable assurance
that the chosen treatment will succeed in promoting the patient's health,
because the therapist owes a fiduciary duty to the patient.
In contrast, when patients change their minds and object to hospi-
talization or treatment that, in a prior advance directive, they assented to,
autonomy values and therapeutic interests may not align as closely and
do not support as lenient an approach. From the perspective of auton-
omy values, two conflicting expressions of autonomy exist-the previ-
ous, presumably competent one and the subsequent one of perhaps more
dubious competency. Although ordinarily a more recent expression of
autonomy is preferred because it more accurately reflects the patient's
120. See Winick, Competency for Treatment, supra note 27, at 44; Winick, Reforming
Incompetency, supra note 30, at 596-605; see, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990)
(deeming incompetent overtly schizophrenic patient exhibiting delusions and hallucinations who
stated that the mental hospital to which he sought admission was "heaven"). Although broad
language in the Zinermon opinion suggests the need for an inquiry into competence whenever a
mentally ill person assents to hospital admission, see id. at 133 n.18, this language is dicta, see
Winick, supra note 118, at 180-81, and should be rejected as unwise and constitutionally
unnecessary. See generally id.; Winick, Reforming Incompetency, supra note 30, at 603-04.
121. See generally Winick, supra note 91.
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current preferences, there may be reason to question whether the
patient's present objection is a product of mental illness rather than gen-
uine autonomy. When the objection is to a therapeutic intervention,
such as hospitalization or conventional treatment, that is recommended
by the patient's therapist, there also may be reason to question whether
the objection might be antitherapeutic and inconsistent with the patient's
welfare. I do not suggest that all objections to hospitalization or treat-
ment suggest incompetency. Patients who change their minds and reject
therapeutic interventions they previously chose in advance directives
may be competent to do so, even if their choice is against clinical advice
and seems unwise. But the higher potential of harm, particularly if seri-
ous, justifies a stricter approach that features a narrower definition of
competency and that does not erect as strong a presumption in its favor.
When a proposed revocation or amendment of an advance directive
instrument presents a serious risk to the individual's welfare, considera-
tions of beneficence may justify an inquiry into competency before the
revocation or amendment is deemed effective.
For these reasons, there should be greater scrutiny of the compe-
tency of individuals seeking to reject a therapeutic intervention they pre-
viously chose in an advance directive instrument than of patients
changing their minds in favor of hospitalization or treatment, and a more
demanding standard of competency should be employed. The presump-
tion of competence should apply in this inquiry, but the level of evi-
dence required to rebut it should be reduced. If, pursuant to this more
demanding standard, the patient is found to be competent, then the
patient's presently expressed objection should take precedence over his
or her previously expressed assent. On the other hand, if the patient's is
found to be incompetent, then the previously expressed assent should
take precedence, unless an unanticipated change in circumstances would
reasonably have led the patient to choose otherwise had he or she antici-
pated it.
122
One problem with this differential approach between assent and
objection is that it might both mask and facilitate coercion. As previ-
ously indicated, family members and clinical staff will sometimes pres-
sure the patient to accept hospitalization or treatment that the patient
does not want. Patients in a questionable state of competence, or who
are incompetent, will be especially vulnerable to these pressures.
Requiring that changes from objection to assent be notarized might pro-
vide a degree of protection, at least against the most overt forms of coer-
cion. For patients interested in additional protection against coercion,
the modified form of "irrevocable" advanced directives previously dis-
122. See supra notes 59-94 and accompanying text.
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cussed could be selected. 23  Such an instrument, as previously indi-
cated, would not be truly irrevocable; rather, it would require judicial or
administrative approval for revocation or modification. 124 This approval
process would provide a degree of scrutiny that would diminish the
potential for coercion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although many details concerning the drafting, use, modification,
and revocability of advance health-care directives remain to be worked
out, these instruments present an exciting new mechanism for dealing
with hospital and treatment refusal issues in the mental health area. The
importance of these instruments will surely expand in the future.
Cruzan's endorsement and popularization of the living will has led to
statutory acceptance of advance health-care instruments generally.
125
Although their extension to the context of mental health treatment has
not yet been fully accepted and raises problems,1 26 a broad area exists in
123. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
124. See supra text accompanying note 106.
125. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(f) & 1396a(w) (1994). This federal statute, called the
Patient Self-Determination Act (the "PSDA"), is an amendment to the Social Security Act, which
established the Medicare and Medicaid programs, and applies to entities participating in the
Medicare and Medicaid programs. See id. Any service provider participating in Medicare or
Medicaid is considered an entity. See Hoge, supra note 40, at 578. Although some mental health
providers and institutions may not realize that the PSDA applies to them, the act covers all service
providers delivering Medicaid and Medicare reimbursable services without limitation. See id. at
578-79. The PSDA defines advance directives as written instruments, recognized under state law,
relating to incapacitated individuals' health care. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(3). The PSDA seeks
to facilitate and promote the use of advance directive instruments by requiring covered providers
to inform patients about state law concerning such instruments and to educate the public about
their use. See Hoge, supra note 40, at 579.
For state statutes authorizing use of such advance directive instruments, see, for example,
ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to 22-8A-10 (1996); ARuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to 36-3210 (West
1996); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7194.5 (West 1996); FLA. STAT. ch. 765 (1995);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to 31-32-12 (1996); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1-55 (West 1992);
MINN. STAT. §§ 145B.01-.17 (1993); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 459.010-459.055 (1995). See also
MEISEL, supra note 20, at 314-19; Perling, supra note 16, at 209. Under some of these statutory
provisions, hospitals and other service providers are required to ascertain whether a patient has
executed a prior advance directive instrument, obtain a copy, and retain it in the patient's file. The
PSDA requires covered providers to document in the patient's medical chart whether he or she has
executed an advance directive instrument. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(f)(l)(B).
An additional innovation that would facilitate the implementation of the patient's wishes
would be a requirement that the state note in its state mental health computer system that a patient
has executed an advance directive instrument. When patients are presented at a hospital or other
mental health facility, the facility could be required to check the state computer system to
ascertain whether the patient has executed an advance directive and to obtain a copy of the
instrument.
126. For example, one significant concern is an individual's ability to anticipate future
circumstances and account for all contingencies. See Appelbaum, supra note 33, at 983. As the
use of these instruments becomes more widespread, lawyers and health-care professionals
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which the use of such instruments by mental patients would be both
constitutionally protected and therapeutically advantageous.
27
As people become more familiar with mental illness and the poten-
tial that they or a close family member may encounter it, the demand for
legal mechanisms to deal with future hospitalization and treatment will
cause legislatures and courts to facilitate the use of advance directives in
the mental health context. Most people execute a will or engage in some
kind of estate planning in contemplation of death. While mental illness
is not as certain as death, the likelihood that it will affect us is considera-
ble. With one in four adult Americans suffering from mental illness
each year-one in twenty encountering it for the first time128 -planning
for this problem is something everyone should consider, particularly in
light of current legal uncertainties and pitfalls. Advance directive instru-
ments in this area therefore represent the future direction of mental
health law.
experienced in their use can help guide individuals through the process of planning and drafting
the instrument. Advance directive instrument forms with optional provisions and riders, and
checklists, will be developed to guide individuals preparing them. These forms, of course, will
need to be tailored to the patient's circumstances, and changes in treatment modalities may be
difficult to foresee, but the process of attempting to do so can have therapeutic value.
127. Some psychiatrists have responded negatively to the use of advance directive instruments
in the mental health treatment context. See, e.g., Paul Chodoff & Roger Peele, The Psychiatric
Will of Dr. Szasz, 13 HASTINGS CTR REP. 11 (1983). However, because these instruments, for the
reasons discussed in supra Part IV, may have therapeutic value, this negative response is
unjustified. See Hoge, supra note 40, at 585 (stating that psychiatrists should share the PSDA's
goal of promoting patient autonomy). Viewed properly, these instruments can provide an
important therapeutic opportunity. Therefore, therapists should welcome, rather than resist them.
128. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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